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Introduction 
When promoted at sites that have traditionally rbeen 
religious in character, heritage tourism evokes 
questions of intentionality (both of destination 
producers and visitors), commodification, and 
authenticity. Indeed, concerns about the 
commercialisation of cultural sites and events by 
tourism have circulated within tourism studies from the 
field’s earliest years (see Greenwood, 1977; Cohen, 
1988; MacCannell, 1992). For several decades critics 
have argued that, while tourism may encourage a 
renewed interest in traditional arts and social practices 
among local craftsmen and others, tourist purchases are 
fuelled by a desire to possess a mark, rather than out of 
any genuine interest in local cultural traditions or 
beliefs (Mathieson and Wall, 1982:165-169). This lack 
of genuine interest may, according to critics, induce 
some local residents, pressured to assume the idealised 
identities which tourists expect, to ‘become other,’ 
resulting in an encounter defined by ‘reciprocal 
misconstructions’ (Lanfant, 1995:35-36), or what Dean 
MacCannell (1994) has called the ‘postmodern 
emptiness’ of (commodified) cultural performance (see 
also Brunner, 1995; Linnekin, 1997:216). As a result, 
given a monetary value, ritual and tradition become 
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When promoted at sites that have traditionally been religious in character, heritage 
tourism evokes questions of intentionality, commodification, and authenticity. In 
particular, tourism at such sites is alleged to flatten out local practices, cause social 
problems, and commercialise the sacred. In short, local cultural practices are presumed 
to be transformed for the worse by tourism, a presumption which implies the existence 
of pristine pre-tourist cultures which can serve as baseline tools for measuring the 
impact of this touristic degradation. In this paper I address these concerns by examining 
tourism at a particular Chinese religious site, recently designated as a national park and 
world heritage site, the Buddhist pilgrimage destination of Mount Wutai (Ch. Wutai 
Shan). In 1982 the Wutai area was designated one of China’s first national parks and in 
2009 was inscribed on UNESCO’s world heritage list. In the last two decades Wutai 
Shan has become one of the most visited religious destinations in northern China, 
primarily by citizens of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). According to local, 
provincial, and national authorities, these overwhelmingly ethnic Han Chinese visitors 
are tourists, not pilgrims. Although the extent to which they identify as Buddhists is 
unclear, religious practice is widespread among visitors. Moreover, this practice is not 
hidden, since the state is very much present at Wutai Shan. State heritage policies at the 
site are designed to protect this as a heritage space, and thus, align with broad UNESCO 
preservation goals, particularly spatial arrangements. However, unlike UNESCO, local, 
provincial, and national authorities do not view tourism as a threat to the ‘heritage’ of 
Wutai Shan. Instead, by eliminating (as a direct effect of UNESCO management 
recommendations) a vibrant informal local economy structured around pilgrimage, state 
officials (particularly provincial and local officials), aim to ‘clean up’ this space, spur 
tourism, and capture a significant share of the resulting revenues. The net result is a 
situation in which state policies simultaneously enable mass tourism, manage religious 
practice, and seek to guide visitor experiences. What remains is not a sacred place 
somehow ruined by tourism and / or commodification, but a quotidian religious space at 
which the thick happenings of Buddhism-in-practice have been curtailed but not 
eliminated. In short, the enactment of this sacred place remains, albeit under the careful 
gaze of various parts of the state.  
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Tourism, the Religious Affairs Commission, the 
Ministry of Housing and Rural Development, and the 
National Forest Administration, among others. State 
heritage policies at Wutai Shan are designed to protect 
this site as a heritage space, and thus, align with broad 
UNESCO preservation goals, particularly spatial 
arrangements. However, unlike UNESCO, local, 
provincial, and national authorities do not view tourism 
as a threat to the ‘heritage’ of Wutai Shan. Instead, by 
eliminating (as a direct effect of UNESCO 
management recommendations) a vibrant informal 
local economy structured around pilgrimage, state 
officials (particularly provincial and local officials), 
aim to ‘clean up’ this space, spur tourism, and capture 
a significant share of the resulting revenues. The net 
result is a situation in which state policies 
simultaneously enable mass tourism, manage religious 
practice, and seek to guide visitor experiences. What 
remains is not a sacred place somehow ruined by 
tourism or commodification, but a quotidian religious 
space at which the thick happenings of Buddhism-in-
practice (such as noise, smells, gambling, soothsaying, 
buying, selling, chatting, singing, dozing, and sundry 
other activities), actions that revolve around temples 
and monasteries, have been curtailed but not 
eliminated. In short, the enactment of this sacred place 
remains, albeit under the careful gaze of various parts 
of the state. If for UNESCO the notion of world 
heritage signifies particular cultural landscapes that 
speak to and hence symbolically belong to a universal 
audience, this specific world heritage site illustrates an 
ongoing Chinese state effort to rationalise and 
formalise social practices (such as worship) that may 
be neither ‘rational’ nor formal. What remains is not 
staged performance, but worship-in-practice that is 
supposed to be cleansed of informality and ambiguity.   
To Categorise or Not to Categorise 
Visitors? A Note on Typology 
In the early years of tourism studies, a good deal of 
work began with the question of intentionality as a 
stepping stone to determining which types of tourists 
were engaged in either a search for or the practice of 
authentic travel (see McCannell, 1976; Cohen, 1988; 
Greenwood, 1977). This desire to delineate resulted in 
various attempts to chart and classify the experiences 
and practices of travellers in contrast to tourists, with 
the former typically framed as active seekers of 
meaning and the latter as passive observers of staged 
performances (see E. Cohen, 1979; Richards and 
Wilson, 2004; S. Cohen, 2010). Among these 
researchers, Erik Cohen has been one of the most 
influential. In his first foray into typologies, he 
Shepherd When Sacred Space becomes a Heritage Place: Pilgrimage, Worship, and Tourism in Contemporary China 
  
  
~ 35 ~ 
valueless for local inhabitants (Harrison, 1994:243-
244). In its extreme form, this argument describes a 
process of ‘McDonaldization’ and ‘Disneyfication’ that 
transforms heritage sites into spaces that resemble 
theme parks, and makes other, presumably more 
authentic travel experiences impossible (Ritzer and 
Liska, 1997:97-101).  
The commercialisation of local cultural practices and 
social relationships as a result of tourism is also 
blamed for social problems such as drug abuse, petty 
crime, environmental degradation, prostitution, and a 
decline in social stability (McLaren, 1998:28). In short, 
(local) cultural practices are presumed to be 
transformed, for the worse, by contact with tourism, a 
presumption which implies the existence of pristine pre
-tourist cultures which serve as baseline tools for 
measuring the impact of this touristic degradation 
(Hitchcock et.al., 1993:8; Wood, 1993:63).  
In this paper, I address these concerns by examining 
tourism at a particular Chinese religious site recently 
designated as a national park and world heritage site - 
the Buddhist pilgrimage destination of Mount Wutai 
(Ch. Wutai Shan). Wutai Shan has been one of the 
most important Buddhist sites in East Asia for 
centuries, drawing pilgrims from China, Tibet, 
Mongolia, Nepal, India, and Japan. In 1982 Wutai 
Valley was designated one of China’s first national 
parks and in 2009 was inscribed on UNESCO’s world 
heritage list. In the last two decades Wutai Shan has 
become one of the most visited religious destinations in 
northern China, attracting approximately four million 
annual visitors in 2012 (GOC, 2011), the vast majority 
of whom are citizens of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). According to local, provincial, and national 
authorities, these overwhelmingly ethnic Han Chinese 
visitors are tourists, not pilgrims. Yet other than 
temples, monasteries, and pilgrimage trails, the area 
offers visitors little diversion. What draws millions of 
people to Wutai Shan each year if they do not worship 
Buddha (baifo)? Is this a case of a once-sacred place 
that has been ‘Disneyfied’ by mass tourism? In other 
words, is this yet another example of the corroding 
effects tourism is supposed to have on the sacred and 
authentic?   
At least in this case, the answer is no. At Wutai Shan, 
religious practice is widespread among visitors, 
although the extent to which most visitors identify as 
Buddhists is questionable. Moreover, this practice is 
not hidden, since the state is very much present at 
Wutai Shan. This includes officials from the State 
Administration of Cultural Heritage, the Ministry of 
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condition is defined by alienation, so if a member of a 
modern society does not recognise his or her own 
alienation this confirms said alienation. In form this 
logic mirrors the false consciousness argument 
employed by Marxists to explain why many workers in 
industrialised societies do not acknowledge their own 
exploitation and thus alienation. What both these 
approaches share is a hegemonic belief that some 
people (such as academic researchers and Marxist 
theorists) are privy to a more accurate realisation of 
reality. To disagree with this view demonstrates one’s 
own inability to reflect on and critically analyse reality.   
But why assume a tourist needs to be alienated in order 
to have a fulfilling travel experience? This only makes 
sense if we first accept the questionable logic that 
someone’s authentic self is located not at home but on 
the road, among strangers. In other words, if we 
assume that modern life is inherently alienating, and if 
we accept the premise that the less-modern is the site 
of authentic being, tourists who do not settle for 
surface experiences and the comforts of modernity are 
logically more correct in their choices. Indeed, these 
appear to be qualitatively better choices. Moreover, 
those who do settle for less do so because they delude 
themselves, not being ‘aware of their 
alienation’ (Cohen 1988:376).  
This perspective is nothing more than a return to the 
cliché of ‘the traveller,’ that heroic Western archetype, 
the he-who-is-not-a-tourist standing in opposition to 
the always-worked upon ‘tourist.’ As I have argued 
elsewhere (Shepherd, 2002; 2003; 2015), self-
identifying travellers are still tourists, they are simply 
tourists who frame and filter their experiences through 
a subjective lens of not identifying as tourists (see also 
Stausberg, 2011). However, this traveller narrative is 
not reducible to a ‘Western’ condition. To do so reifies 
a different dichotomy, the ‘East’ in contrast to the 
‘West.’ This assumes a monolithic Western condition, 
when it in actuality reflects the values and perspectives 
of a specific class of people (those who believe 
alienation is part and parcel of the condition of 
Modernity). 
Of course, one might say this discussion is no longer 
relevant in an era of postmodern tourism. 
Constructivists point out that people travel for a 
multitude of reasons (Collins-Kreiner, 2010; Digance, 
2006; Maoz and Beckerman, 2010), and even at a 
religious site, ostensibly faith-driven visitors engage in 
a range of behaviours. They may pray, travel along a 
pre-determined route, visit a set number of shrine-like 
destinations, and yet also eat well, shop for souvenirs, 
classified tourists as ‘drifters,’ ‘explorers,’ ‘individual 
mass tourists,’ and ‘group mass tourists’ (Cohen, 
1972). In his later work, he posited five categories of 
tourists, ranging from ‘recreational’ and ‘diversionary’ 
travellers who had no concern with authenticity to 
‘experiential,’ ‘experimental’ and ‘existential’ tourists, 
of whom the latter, he argued, seek the most profound 
and deepest experiences (1988:377). This typological 
approach has continued to be commonplaces. For 
example, in her discussion of British tourists at beach 
destinations in Greece, Wickens (2002) categorises 
tourists as heritage seekers, ‘ravers’ (hedonists), 
‘Shirley Valentines’ (British women seeking a Greek 
man for romance), ‘heliolatrous’ (sun worshippers), 
and ‘Lord Byrons’ (Grecophiles).  
These attempts to situate the particularities of tourism 
experiences into broad categories raise several issues. 
First, such an approach assumes that tourists actually 
can be classified into distinct categories. In the above 
example, might a British female tourist not only 
engage in a short term sexual relationship with a local 
Greek man (or vice-versa) while on vacation, but also 
spend time sunning on a beach, partying at night, 
visiting cultural sites on rainy days, and returning in 
the future to do this all over again? In other words, 
classifying tourists by mono-intentionality ignores the 
broad spectrum of everyday tourist behaviour. People 
engage in a range of activities while on vacation. In 
short, monolithic categories leak.  
A second question about typologies is the implicit 
ranking of types that follows from initial assumptions 
of what tourists should do. According to MacCannell 
(1976), the touristic quest is a search for one’s 
authentic self, a quest which, according to Erik Cohen, 
is a search for what has not yet been tainted by 
modernity (1988:374). If we assume this search is the 
point of tourism, the hierarchy implied among Cohen’s 
five tourist types seems quite logical: from those who 
are completely unreflective and focus solely on 
physical pleasure to existentialists who are profoundly 
aware of the alienating effects of modernity. Or, to 
quote Cohen:  
those who are disposed to reflect upon their life 
situation are more aware of their alienation 
than those who do not tend to such 
contemplation (1988:376). 
In other words, to not feel alienated indicates a 
misrecognition of one’s own self-alienation.  
This claim presumes that residents of complex, modern 
societies are in fact alienated from their authentic 
selves. It thus, is a circular argument: the modern 
  
between a destination valued for its cosmological 
significance and one valued for other reasons, it also 
erases the very notion of sacred space (Timothy and 
Olsen 2006): when everything is equally valuable 
nothing is sacred. Moreover, a questioning of abstract 
categories does not mean that differences do not in fact 
exist among visitors to religious sites (Eade & Sallnow 
1991). For a place to be sacred, whether in a religious 
sense (such as Varanasi in India or Lourdes in France) 
or a secular sense (such as Graceland in Memphis or, 
say, the American baseball Hall of Fame in 
Cooperstown, New York), one must understand and 
experience this sacredness (Bremer 2006). 
Tourism at Religious Sites 
What then of tourism and religion, or more to the 
point, tourism at religious sites, in China? Zhang Mu 
and his colleagues describe religious tourism as,  
a special tourist activity orientated by religious 
culture with the help of a specific eco-cultural 
environment (2007: 101).  
They also assert that most Han Chinese do not believe 
in a deity or practice religion, and therefore, visit 
historic pilgrimage sites such as the Buddhist 
mountains of Ermei Shan in Sichuan and Wutai Shan 
in Shanxi for cultural and historical reasons. These 
visitors are thus, ‘cultural pilgrims’ (ibid:105). 
Similarly, Zhang Cheng (2002), while agreeing that the 
number of Han Chinese visitors to religious sites has 
grown in China, suggests that contemporary Chinese 
tourists do not practice religion when they tour these 
sites. Finally, religious destinations in the PRC, 
particularly Buddhist sites that attract an ethnic cross-
section of visitors including Han, Meng (Mongolian) 
and Zang (Tibetan), are described by national tourism 
authorities as ‘religious-cultural tourism’ (zongjiao 
wenhua luyou). For example, according to official 
statistics, religious devotees constitute less than ten 
percent of the annual tourist arrivals at Wutai Shan. 
The most comprehensive data on visitor arrivals, 
compiled for Wutai Shan’s world heritage nomination 
application in 2007, estimated that 59,400 of a total of 
575,000 arrivals in August 2006, the busiest tourist 
month in the PRC, were religious pilgrims (GOC, 
2008a:233). In conversations with a local official in 
2010, I was told that only one in eight visitors came for 
religious reasons. The rest were tourists, he explained.  
These data support the claim that few Han Chinese 
practice religion. From this perspective, tourists visit 
Wutai Shan not because it is sacred but because it is an 
historical and cultural destination that demonstrates the 
country’s unified multi-ethnic basis. From a national 
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and, broadly speaking, have fun, thereby collapsing 
distinctions between secular and religious, serious and 
playful, contemplation and entertainment. According to 
Collins-Kreiner (2010), ‘no place is intrinsically 
sacred’ (2010:444), ‘each person may interpret his or 
her own experience differently’ (448) and 
consequently, ‘issues of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ seem less 
important in the post-modern world, and may not even 
exist’ (450). This is a view endorsed by Maoz and 
Beckerman (2010:436), who reject any distinctions 
between pilgrims and tourists. Oakes and Sutton (2010) 
suggest that tourist and pilgrim intentions overlap, as 
pilgrims also act as tourists while some tourists may 
engage in religious practices. The logical endpoint of 
this perspective rejects any distinction between secular 
and religious travel, asserting that any journey that is 
‘redolent with [personal] meaning’ can be classified as 
a pilgrimage (Digance, 2006:36). Thus, a wide variety 
of travel actions which are not formally religious can 
nevertheless serve a sacred-like purpose (Badone & 
Roseman, 2004:2). 
I fully recognise and accept the critique of typologies 
and the ambiguity of intentionality. But I do see value 
in recognising that visitors to, in this case study, a site 
that has been a sacred destination for centuries, may 
engage in a range of behaviours while having a 
primary intention. For example, some visitors to 
religious sites in any society are undoubtedly 
motivated by supernatural goals, desires, or intentions 
(Eade and Sallnow, 1991). This raises the issue of the 
relationship between the intentions of visitors and the 
purposes of a (religious) site. At a site that is 
considered sacred space for very specific and exclusive 
reasons, do the intentions of all visitors have equal 
standing or even relevancy? Or does the sacredness of 
a site serve as a stopping point for personal 
intentionality? In this case study, Wutai Shan is not 
sacred because it is the location of certain temples and 
monasteries; it is sacred because the landscape has 
been believed to be the home of Manjusri, the 
Bodhisattva of Wisdom, by Buddhists in the East 
Asian region, since at least the Fifth Century CE. In 
other words, the religious material culture which 
UNESCO has classified as world heritage is not the 
source of Wutai Shan’s aura; these buildings affirm an 
already-present sacred landscape (and in the process 
add to the sacredness of the landscape).  
An erasure of all differences between pilgrims and 
tourists rests on an anthropologically thin basis (see 
Stausberg, 2011). First of all, to characterise a 
pilgrimage site as any place to which people travel (see 
Digance, 2006) not only negates any differences 
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In retrospect, urban work units and rural communes 
were as much pedagogical tools as they were political 
institutions, designed not just to control citizens 
spatially but also to shape them morally. Paradoxically, 
while aimed at undermining kin ties (the social glue of 
Confucianism) this social structure used the 
foundational premise of Confucianism (that all people 
can be improved through a combination of social 
modelling and self-cultivation) as a key organising 
principle. This was combined with Mao’s believe that 
the collective will power of society could enable China 
to literally leap through material stages of development 
and thereby achieve authentic communism without 
passing through a capitalist stage.  
Although the reform period in China began in 1978, 
work unit culture only began to be dismantled after 
1989. Housing is now private, people can change their 
jobs at will, and travel is a matter of money and not 
state permission. Most importantly, social and 
economic changes have eroded any belief in 
communism, creating a space for religious faith while 
raising questions about the role of the CCP. In short, if 
the Chinese Communist Party no longer advocates 
communism in practice, what is the ideological 
justification for its rule?   
The CCP has responded to this legitimacy dilemma by 
jettisoning Mao’s profoundly non-Marxist 
interpretation of the relationship between a society’s 
base and superstructure (Anagnost, 1997:84). Mao had 
rejected the fundamental Marxist point that a society’s 
material base (its stage of development) determined its 
social development (its superstructure), instead arguing 
that the collective will of Chinese people could 
transform the base itself, thus fast-tracking China’s 
advance towards communism. After gaining power in 
1979, Deng Xiaoping shifted the political focus away 
from class struggle towards general prosperity 
(xiaokang shehui), based on material and spiritual 
civilisation (jingshen wenming). That is to say, while 
he radically transformed the economic basis of Chinese 
society by embracing (limited) private market action, 
he did not intend to allow market forces to shape social 
and moral behaviour. Deng thus, was as much a 
heretical Marxist as was Mao. While Mao had 
attempted to use the superstructure to transform the 
base, Deng sought to prevent the base from 
transforming the superstructure. 
Importantly, ‘spiritual’ as used in Chinese does not 
connote the supernatural, paranormal, or Godly. It 
instead signifies ethical and moral attributes that 
characterise right-thinking and right-acting citizens and 
state perspective, increased tourism is desirable, since 
this will further a national campaign of 
‘civilisation’ (wenming) and educate visitors. Local 
and provincial authorities support increased tourism 
which  will spur development and generate revenues. 
Both perspectives are quite different from that of 
UNESCO and related institutions such as the 
International Committee on Monuments and Sites 
(ICOMOS), which consider sites such as Wutai Shan 
to be parts of a collective world heritage that require 
protection from, broadly speaking, modernisation. In 
this particular case state development policies that have 
sought to expand the domestic tourism industry for not 
just political and economic reasons but also what is 
termed in Chinese as ‘spiritual’ (jingshen) concerns. 
Heritage, be this religious or otherwise, is part and 
parcel of a broader state-directed campaign to cultivate 
and boost the spiritual[1] basis of development, thereby 
balancing out material (wuzhi) development and 
increasing the civilisational level of the Chinese Nation 
(Shepherd, 2012).   
The ‘Spiritual’ in Revolutionary China 
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China in October 1949, both tourism and pilgrimage 
effectively ended. Led by Mao Zedong, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) aimed to reorder not only the 
(material) means of production but also the moral basis 
of citizens. This in turn required a spatial reordering of 
urban residents into work units and peasants into 
communes (Anagnost, 1994).  
The primary objective of work units was to replace the 
foundational role family ties had played in Chinese 
society for thousands of years with a new form of 
community, a fully rationalised, organised, and 
planned micro-society that simultaneously displaced 
preferential kin ties and turned social relationships into 
an aspect of economic production (Bray, 2005:96). 
Work units provided members with food, clothing, 
housing, education, and employment, functioned as the 
primary social web for members, and served as a 
foundational aspect of identity (Leung, 2000:618). 
They also were the primary (and for most people, the 
only) source of travel, in the form of collective annual 
vacations. At the height of socialism in China, tourism 
as an individual activity became impossible. All hotels, 
restaurants, and forms of transportation were state-
owned, and official letters were required to access 
these services. 
1. This Chinese notion of ‘spiritual’ does not reflect any 
cosmological linkage but rather a sense of ‘Chinese-
ness.’ It thus describes an ethno-moral aspect of personal 
character.  
  
in contrast, signifies a society of productive, socially 
responsible, and increasingly self-disciplined citizens, 
who understand the need to check their individual 
behaviour, so as to assist state leaders with the 
development of a materially and spiritually modern 
society (Friedman, 2004:691). Wenming thus 
communicates both a historical basis of development 
and a contemporary sense of what it means to be 
modern and Chinese. 
This ideal civil society is guided by the moral 
attributes of suzhi (quality) and wenhua (culture). Until 
the late 1970s suzhi conveyed a sense of in-born 
character, in contrast to suyang, one’s embodied or 
learned character. Used in this sense, a person’s bad 
character might be blamed on either family 
background or a lack of education. However, with the 
imposition of a national one-child policy in 1978 suzhi 
was re-defined and assiduously promoted by state 
authorities as not an in-born attribute, but a broader 
qualitative measurement of social worth as embodied 
by a person’s relative development (Kipnis, 2006:299-
300). Those who possess a high level of suzhi possess 
proper (physical) health, (mental) intelligence, and 
(moral) character, attributes that have Maoist and 
Confucianist foundations as well as self-cultivation 
practices such tai qi, qigong, and wushu (Jacka, 2009).    
‘Quality’ and ‘culture’ are not just key words of the 
Party but just as importantly of an emerging middle 
class and affluent elite. This is because the peasantry 
and working class are no longer viewed as models of 
ideological correctness and social awareness, as during 
the Maoist era, but different from ‘higher quality’ 
citizens. This repositioning of the middle and upper 
classes as role models for advancement is a sharp 
break from the class politics of Mao’s era, when 
anyone with kin ties to intellectuals, capitalists, or the 
petty bourgeoisie experienced ostracism or worse. But, 
in today’s China, being civil and civilized is a matter 
of education, social standing, and wealth, not of 
revolutionary credentials (Anagnost, 1997:86). In other 
words, the vanguard of a future society of material 
affluence, social stability, and proper moral character 
is no longer the working class and peasantry but the 
emerging bourgeoisie. 
Far from being either the enemy of the people or the 
Communist Party, this emerging class of middle and 
upper class elites is of crucial importance in the 
construction of what the Party defines as a Chinese 
modern society. Moreover, rather than contesting a 
state and CCP focus on cultivating civilization and 
lifting the quality of the masses, many emerging elites 
Shepherd When Sacred Space becomes a Heritage Place: Pilgrimage, Worship, and Tourism in Contemporary China 
  
  
~ 39 ~ 
is thus more akin to the English language concept of 
‘virtuous’ (Kipnis, 2006). Deng’s approach thus 
echoed late nineteenth century reformers who 
advocated using foreign technology and products while 
maintaining a (presumed) Chinese cultural essence 
(Dynon, 2008:86). For example, Deng began the first 
‘Spiritual Civilization Campaign’ (jingshen wenhua 
yundong) in 1982, which promoted public morality 
(gongde), patriotism (aiguo zhuyi), culture (wenhua), 
discipline (jilu), and ideals (lixiang).  
A second Spiritual Civilization Campaign was 
launched in 1996 by Jiang Zemin, the former party 
leader of Shanghai who rose to power in the wake of 
the Tiananmen Square violence in the spring of 1989. 
Whereas Deng’s 1982 campaign had at least made a 
pro forma recognition of the role of collectivisation in 
Chinese society, Jiang’s 1996 campaign replaced the 
language of socialism with that of cultural nationalism 
(Dynon, 2008:93). In 1997 the State Council, China’s 
highest body, established the Central Commission for 
Building Spiritual Civilization (zhongyang jingshen 
weming jianshe zhidao weiyuanwei). It was given three 
responsibilities: improving technical aspects of life, 
increasing public awareness of the law, and promoting 
physical fitness and hygiene. More broadly, however, 
this commission was tasked with overseeing the 
‘cultural engineering’ (wenhua gongcheng) of society 
(Tomba, 2009:606). 
This civilization campaign has both an Enlightenment 
and Confucianist base, which reflects the more than 
one hundred year-long debate among Chinese 
intellectuals across the political spectrum about how to 
be simultaneously modern and Chinese. Wenming 
(civilization) is not actually a Chinese word but a 
cultural borrowing from Meiji Japan (Friedman, 2004). 
Like its Japanese equivalent bunmei, wenming has two 
distinct connotations, one spiritual and the other 
material (Anagnost, 1997). For the former, wenming 
refers to what is often described by state officials as 
well as Han Chinese citizens as a unified history of 
thousands of years, making China unique in the world. 
But this term also describes an always-becoming civil 
society that signals not an unbroken historical narrative 
but an emerging present and future rooted in the flux of 
modernity. This is a starkly different view of society 
than imagined by European and American proponents 
of ‘civil society.’ Proponents of the latter perspective 
believe that a civil society (a society filled with non-
state organisations) is needed to check the power of the 
state, promote ethnic, racial, and social tolerance, and 
eventually encourage the development of material 
security for its members. The Chinese term wenming, 
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saga of movements in the early 1990s that were loosely 
affiliated with Buddhism such as Zhong Gong and 
Falun Gong. At their height these groups attracted 
millions of followers and generated enormous sums of 
money, but were banned and suppressed when they 
were perceived to threaten the interests and paramount 
role of the Communist Party. In contrast to these 
groups, religious practitioners who studiously avoid 
political questions are largely left alone. Indeed, 
Buddhism in general and Tibetan Buddhism in 
particular have boomed in recent years, both in rural 
and urban areas.  
In urban bookstores, religious publications ranging 
from Buddhist and Daoist classics to spiritual guides 
by prominent monks are just as common as titles in the 
rapidly expanding field of self-help and self-
development, which promise their readers efficient 
ways of raising their personal quality (suzhi). 
Meanwhile, a ‘Tibet craze’ (xizang) among urban 
sophisticates that began in the years after 1989 shows 
no sign of slowing. Tibet as a symbol of simplicity, 
nature, folk wisdom, and esoteric Buddhism, serves as 
a backdrop for advertisers selling beer, bottled water, 
and healthy foods, while Han musicians and artists 
reproduce these images in their work. Tibet-themed 
shops sell ethnic jewellery, clothing, and handbags in 
upscale shopping areas of Beijing, Shanghai, and other 
coastal cities. No longer are Tibetans characterised as 
materially backward, morally suspect, and victims of 
feudal superstitions. Nor is it necessarily the duty of 
Han Chinese to modernise Tibetans. Tibetans are now 
‘magical’ and ‘mysterious,’ no longer simply 
‘superstitious.’   
It is tempting to explain this transformation of Tibetans 
from primitive threat to mystical ‘Other’ among urban 
Chinese sophisticates as an appropriation of 
Orientalising Euro-American stereotypes about Tibet 
and Tibetans, mirroring what Michel-Rolph Trouillot 
(2003) has termed anthropology’s ‘savage slot.’ 
However, this reimagining of Tibet and Tibetan 
Buddhism also reflects a return to a historical 
trajectory that has linked Tibet with China religiously 
and culturally since the Tang Dynasty (618-8907 CE), 
especially during the Yuan (1271-1368 CE) and Qing 
(1644-1912 CE) eras (Tuttle 2005:222). Moreover, the 
most important Tibetan Buddhist site in mainland 
China outside of Tibet is Wutai Shan. This was 
recently illustrated by the announcement that the 
current Dalai Lama would like to visit this area, as did 
several of his predecessors, most notably the 
Thirteenth Dalai Lama, who stayed at the Pusa Temple 
in Taihui during a pilgrimage tour in 1908.   
share this goal (Nyiri, 2006:88). But what role does 
religion have in this? At a time when the Communist 
Party has officially postponed communism while 
remaining atheistic, has faith returned to the quotidian?  
Pilgrimages and Tourists in China 
Pilgrimage has been practiced by Buddhists and 
Daoists in China for centuries. People historically have 
travelled to sacred destinations for a variety of reasons, 
ranging from formal obligations for rulers and dynastic 
officials and contemplative experience for the literati 
during the dynastic era, to everyday acts such as 
penance, health, and future prosperity for commoners 
(Naquin & Yu, 1992). Chinese pilgrimage practices 
have a shared affinity for a particular type of 
destination, mountains believed to possess a 
charismatic aura that is independent of built space. 
This is reflected in the Chinese term for pilgrimage, 
chaoshan jinxiang, ‘to bring incense and pay respects 
to a (sacred) mountain’ (shortened to chaoxiang to 
refer to pilgrims) (ibid:11-12).  
By the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), four Buddhist 
mountains had been identified and transformed into 
pilgrimage destinations:  
• in the north, Wutai Shan (Shanxi Province); 
• in the west, Emei Shan (Sichuan); 
• in the east, Putao Shan (Zhejiang), and; 
• in the south, Jiuhua Shan (Anhui).  
However, these destinations served different purposes 
for different groups. The literary elite visited sacred 
mountains not so much to pray as to appreciate nature 
and history by experiencing ‘scenic spots’ (jingdian), 
destinations marked by artists, poets, and former rulers 
(Nyiri, 2006:12-13). For centuries, lay people have 
visited sacred mountains for reasons of health, 
penance, and prosperity, while Tibetan and Mongolian 
Buddhist monks and nuns have done so to pray and 
make merit. In contrast, Chan (Zen) Buddhist monks 
historically were not supposed to carry out pilgrimages 
to specific sacred sites but instead, to wander between 
these sites.  
The phenomenon of wandering monks as well as 
religious tourism has re-emerged in the last two 
decades as state control over mobility has decreased. 
The main government and Party concern with Buddhist 
religious practitioners, as with followers of other faiths, 
is political stability: as long as they avoid political 
issues and do not pose a threat to the government or 
CCP, they are largely left alone. A case in point is the 
  
In addition to official recognition and funding, Wutai 
Shan also became an Imperial destination. For 
example, between 1683 and 1710 Emperor Kangxi 
visited the valley five times. The role of Wutai was 
thus similar to that of the northeastern city of Jehol 
(Chengde), site of an extensive summer palace and 
temple complex built during the reigns of Kangxi and 
Qianlong. Occasional imperial visits to Wutai were 
replaced after 1710 by annual visits to Jehol. Wutai 
Shan and Jehol served dual purposes, as links between 
the Manchurian rulers and China’s imperial past and as 
sites that symbolically marked the differences between 
the (Manchurian) Qing and their Chinese subjects. 
Consequently, the Wutai religious economy flourished 
during the Qing era. At the time of the 1911 
Nationalist Revolution, the valley was home to more 
than forty major temples and monasteries and several 
hundred lesser sites, including temples, caves, and 
shrines sacred to Han Chinese, Mongolians, and 
Tibetans, scattered in a radius of several hundred 
kilometres.  
The 1911 Revolution had little material impact on 
Wutai Shan, in part because of its relative isolation. 
Direct funding from the court, however, ended. 
Monasteries adapted to these changes by seeking 
increased and more elaborate donations from pilgrims, 
especially those coming from Mongolia and Tibet. 
During the war with Japan (1937-1945) and the 
Chinese civil war (1945-1949) the Wutai valley 
suffered little damage. After the 1949 establishment of 
the People’s Republic, the new government initially 
placed monasteries and temples in the valley under 
state protection and allowed worship to continue. 
However, during the collapse of state authority in the 
Cultural Revolution, monks were beaten, evicted and 
in some cases killed, and temples and monasteries 
were attacked and damaged by Red Guards. It was 
only in the late 1980s that monasteries and temples 
were allowed to reopen, albeit under strict government 
control.  
Wutai Shan was decreed a national scenic spot 
(jingdian) and national park by the State Council in 
1982 and a national forest preserve in 1992. In 1997 it 
was listed as one of the top thirty-five ‘elite attractions’ 
in China by the National Tourism Bureau and in 1998 
designated a civilised scenic spot (wenming jingdian) 
by the Shanxi Provincial government, which also 
issued a master plan for development of the area. The 
entire valley was added to China’s tentative list of 
UNESCO heritage sites in 2001.  
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Situating Wutai Shan 
Wutai Shan (literally ‘the mountain of five peaks’) is 
located in central Shanxi Province, approximately three 
hundred and fifty kilometres southwest of Beijing. The 
Wutai area is a short distance from the Mongolian 
steppe and roughly equidistance between the cities of 
Datong, two hundred kilometres to the north and 
Taiyuan, two hundred and forty kilometres to the 
south. While the elevation in the centre of the valley at 
the monastery town of Taihui is approximately 1,100 
meters, the surrounding peaks reach over 3,000 meters, 
making these the highest mountains in northern China. 
Wutai Shan was one of the PRC’s first national parks 
(1982) and forest preserves (1992), and was added to 
UNESCO’s world heritage list in 2009. Wutai National 
Park, which encompasses the entire valley, receives 
approximately 2.6 million visitors each year, almost all 
of whom are domestic residents.  
The sacred aura of the Wutai area predates the 
introduction of Buddhism to China in the third century 
CE. During the Han dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE), the 
area was popular among Daoists as a refuge and 
retreat. In the fourth century, the rulers of the northern 
Wei Dynasty (386-534 BCE) constructed several 
temples in the area dedicated to the Bodhisattva 
Manjusri (Ch. Wenshu Shuli), and by the late Tang 
Dynasty (618-907) Wutai Shan, also known as 
Qingliang Shan, had become a major pilgrimage site 
for Buddhists throughout East Asia (Chou, 2007:108). 
This history illustrates not so much the sacralisation of 
Wutai Shan, as its identification, first by Daoists and 
later by Buddhists, as a place that possessed a sacred 
aura.   
In the late thirteenth century the Mongolian leader 
Kublai Khan, founder of the Yuan Dynasty (1271-
1368), introduced Tibetan Buddhism to the area. This 
Tibetan presence later was expanded under the 
patronage of the Manchurian Qing Dynasty (1644-
1911), particularly the Kangxi Emperor (reigned 1661-
1722) and his grandson the Qianglong Emperor 
(reigned 1735-1799). During this long period of 
political stability and economic prosperity, Qing 
administrators poured resources into Wutai Shan and 
patronised the Gelukpa School of Tibetan Buddhism. 
In 1659 Tibetan Buddhists were granted control of the 
major religious sites at Wutai and in 1705 the Kangxi 
Emperor decreed that all ten Mahayana monasteries at 
Wutai be converted to Tibetan Buddhism (Kohle, 
2008:78). Subsequently, these monasteries were 
directly funded by the imperial court during Qianlong’s 
reign (GOC, 2008(a):117). 
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While this report suggests that Wutai National Park is 
a cultural and historical site akin to an open-air 
museum, or a natural site similar to Jiuzhaigou in 
Sichuan, or Yellowstone in Wyoming, USA, the reality 
is quite different. The valley currently has 47 
functioning monasteries and temples, representing both 
Mahayana and Tibetan Buddhism. According to 
official data, approximately 2,500 Buddhist monks and 
nuns live within the park boundaries (GOC, 
2008a:234). This is the largest official concentration of 
Buddhist monks and nuns in China outside of Tibet.  
Tourism and Faith at Wutai Shan 
As noted above, official data suggest that few visitors 
to Wutai National Park have religious intentions. Yet, 
the temples inside the park are typically crowded with 
people worshipping Buddha (baifo) through kneeling, 
praying, bowing, and burning incense. Are local 
officials deliberately seeking to deceive by 
misreporting intentions? If so, for what purpose would 
they do so? And just whom would they seek to 
deceive?  
This is an example of how visitor categories are 
culturally constructed. In this particular case, there is 
no reliable way for either national park or local 
government officials to know precisely why people 
visit Wutai Shan. This is because there is no national 
park entry form with a box to tick showing a reason for 
visiting. Instead, visitors enter a welcome hall, buy 
tickets, and pass through electronic turnstiles that count 
the raw number of arrivals. While registration forms 
must be filled out at hotels in and around the park, 
these do not ask the specific intentions of visitors. 
Hence there is no accurate way to calculate who is 
visiting for what reasons, except by relying on the 
popular discourse of religion in China: Mongolians and 
Tibetans (because of their ethnicity), and Han Chinese 
who publicly mark themselves as religious (by 
donning the robes of monks and nuns and shaving their 
heads) are popularly assumed to be religious; everyone 
else is assumed to be a tourist. This conventional 
wisdom is also reflected in how people identify, which 
in turn reflects the Communist Party’s ambiguous 
relationship with religion.  
According to government statistics, the total number of 
religious believers in China is 144 million, 
approximately ten percent of the population. However, 
this figure accounts only for people who either have a 
formal affiliation with a church, mosque, or temple, or 
self-identify with religious institutions or associations 
of the five officially recognised faiths (Buddhism, 
This initial application for world heritage status did not 
discuss Wutai Shan’s role as a pilgrimage site for 
Buddhist religious practice. Instead, the nomination 
report stressed its geological importance, unique 
ecology, value as a meteorological research site, role as 
a guerrilla base during the anti-Japanese War (1937-
1945), and historical contribution to Chinese 
Buddhism. In terms of the latter, the nomination file 
emphasised the historical, artistic, and scientific merits 
of the site, not religious practice (UNESCO 2010b). In 
fact, religious practice was not mentioned at all. This 
reflects the Chinese state narrative that religion is a 
historical practice that will eventually disappear 
through a continued process of social evolution and a 
UNESCO emphasis on material culture as heritage. 
A revised master plan issued in 2005 divided the 
national park into four zones centred on Taihuai town, 
location of the most important monasteries and 
temples. The plan also called for the resettlement of 
most local residents outside the park boundaries (GOC, 
2008b:240-241). After this plan was approved by the 
Government of China and UNESCO officials, Wutai 
was formally nominated for world heritage status in 
March 2008 (GOC, 2008a:35). References to the 
political importance of Wutai for the Communist Party 
as a revolutionary site were eliminated. However, these 
were not replaced by a more prominent focus on 
Buddhism but instead an emphasis on the area’s 
cultural and natural attributes. For example, the 
nomination file states that temples and monasteries 
demonstrate not the importance of Wutai Shan as a 
Buddhist pilgrimage site but ‘Chinese ancient building 
techniques and art’ while Buddhist statues ‘display 
Chinese people’s genius in art’ (Ibid:14). Pilgrimage, 
the primary reason for people to visit this area for 
centuries, is mentioned, but only in passing and only 
then as a practice of foreign Buddhists and local 
Tibetans and Mongolians, not Han Chinese (GOC, 
2008a:27). Instead of Buddhist pilgrimage practices, 
the nomination report highlights Wutai Shan’s 
geological and biological characteristics (ibid:18-34).  
Recent history, particularly Chinese Communist Party 
policies that prohibited religious practice under Mao, 
are noticeably absent from both this nomination report 
and the UNESCO evaluation of this application. The 
UNESCO evaluation report noted that,  
Mount Wutai declined through social instability 
[during the last years of the Qing Dynasty and 
the Republican period (1911-1949), but] since 
1949 and the founding of the People’s Republic 
of China, efforts have been directed at reviving 
and protecting the buildings (UNESCO, 
2009:4).  
  
Instead, it serves is a means of accentuating material 
wealth, gaining or maintaining health, or achieving 
specific goals.  
This is illustrated by the most common Chinese 
translation of the English word, ‘worship,’ bai. Unlike 
‘worship,’ bai is used specifically to describe acts of 
venerating the Buddha, for example by burning incense 
and ritually bowing. This is different than intercessory 
‘praying,’ usually associated with the Abrahamic 
religions and translated as qidao, ‘to entreat or beg.’ 
Thus, while acts of piety at Buddhist temples are 
described as ‘worshipping Buddha,’ the actual 
intentions of practitioners may not be what non-
Chinese speakers usually associate with the piety of, 
for example, Christian and Muslim worshipers. In 
addition, and as noted above, identifying as a Buddhist, 
Daoist, Christian, Muslim, or Catholic implies formal 
membership in a congregation or community. Thus the 
official data that appear to show that very few Chinese 
citizens are religious, in reality demonstrates that 
relatively few people identify as members of place-
based religious communities. The pragmatic and 
situational practice of Buddhism and Daoism is 
widespread. 
The reshaping of religious sites such as Wutai Shan 
into tourist and heritage destinations is a continuation 
of previous Party and State efforts to control religious 
practice. Both under Mao and during the ongoing 
reform period, major religious sites have not been 
destroyed. Even at the height of Maoist radicalism, the 
Party did not advocate a deliberate policy of physical 
destruction of religious sites. Instead, temples, 
churches and mosques were turned into schools, 
warehouses, and other public facilities, reflecting the 
utilitarian aspects of communism-in-practice. From the 
village level up through all layers of society, the Party-
State appropriated religious space for educational and 
recreational purposes (Anagnost, 1994:221). Until 
recently, one could argue that state officials sought to 
cleanse these religious spaces of ritualised faith, 
defined in the language of the Party as feudal 
(fengjian) and superstitious (mixin), and transform 
them into healthy spaces (Ibid:222). Yet an 
examination of the religious economy of Wutai Shan 
demonstrates quite the opposite. The State and Party 
no longer seek to eradicate faith by banning its practice 
and seizing control of sacred space. Instead, it now 
seeks to manage faith through reshaping sacred places 
into heritage sites.  
In Wutai National Park this takes various forms, from 
surveillance of monastic communities and registration 
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Islam, Daoism, Protestant Christianity, and 
Catholicism). A much larger number of people engage 
in occasional religious practices without formal 
affiliation. In addition, folk practices (minjian xinyang) 
such as ancestor worship and lineage temples have 
been revived, particularly in rural areas, while fringe 
groups and various practices deemed 
‘superstitions’ (mixin) are closely watched, controlled, 
and usually suppressed (Yao, 2007:173). This 
especially applies to activities labeled as feudal 
superstitions (fengjian mixin), which the CCP defines 
as social practices that involve a medium or formal 
social network, as opposed to ‘common 
superstitions’ (yiban mixin), another term for folk 
practices.  
Both social science research and popular media reports 
suggest that a much broader part of the population 
practices religion to some extent, particularly 
Buddhism, than official statistics show (see Chau, 
2011). For example, drawing on survey data collected 
in six Chinese cities in 1995 and 2005, Yao (2007) 
reports that only a small percentage of respondents 
(3.6% in 1995, 5.3% in 2005) self-identified as 
religious (Yao, 2007:174). Yet, a majority of those 
surveyed in 1995 believed in fate and fortune (57.7%), 
and a similar number engaged in religious practices 
such as burning paper money and worshipping 
ancestors (53.9%). In the 2005 survey, while just 2.6% 
of respondents identified as Buddhists, 14.8% of all 
respondents kept an image of Buddha at home, 23.1% 
had worshipped at a Buddhist temple in the previous 
year, and 77.2% agreed with the fundamental Buddhist 
precept that ‘goodness will have good 
recompense’ (Ibid:176-178). In other words, while 
religion as an exclusive or primary identity marker is 
quite low among Han Chinese, religious practice, 
especially Buddhism, is increasingly important and 
common, as seen in activities of visitors to Wutai Shan.  
These data illustrate how improved living standards 
and increased incomes have not led to a decline in 
religious practice. But, nor does this demonstrate a 
religious revival. Some researchers have suggested that 
a turn to spirituality and religion reflects a popular 
desire for something to believe in after the CCP 
repudiation of Maoism, or as a coping mechanism in 
the face of rapid change in everyday life brought about 
by large-scale modernisation. While this is certainly 
plausible, pragmatic utilitarian reasons should not be 
overlooked (Lai, 2003; Yao, 2007). Buddhism in 
particular is much more visible in today’s China, but 
not, at least for most practitioners, as a vehicle for 
spiritual salvation or as an escape from materialism. 
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generous donations, or purchase the counsel of eminent 
monks. Most tourists arrive by car or tour bus and stay 
for two or three days. They tour the major sites in 
groups led by state-licensed guides, and in the 
evenings eat, drink, or visit cultural performances such 
as Shanxi Opera. However, what links all of these 
different forms of practice is the central role of baifo: 
venerating the Buddha. While not necessarily 
identifying as either pilgrims or religious adherents, 
Han Chinese tourists engage in pilgrimage-like 
religious activities. In doing so they confront a state-
directed effort to manage their experiences, an effort 
ironically sanctioned by UNESCO’s modernist vision 
of how world heritage should look.  
of monks and nuns (who in turn receive monthly 
stipends) to signage aimed at local residents that 
prescribes how they should act within the park 
(Shepherd, 2013). But, the most important effect of this 
state management effort is the radical remaking of 
space within the recently designated park core zone. 
Private homes, shops, and guesthouses in the village of 
Taihuai have been destroyed and farmland turned into 
green park space as part of the official management 
plan. With the approval of UNESCO, a majority of 
secular residents will eventually be relocated to a 
newly built satellite community outside the park’s 
south gate. Far from leading to the commercialisation 
of the sacred, heritage preservation (and by extension 
tourism) has in this case had a very different effect. 
What is called in Chinese the renao (‘hot and noisy’) 
thick realities of Buddhism-in-practice is gradually 
being eradicated, replaced by a preserved zone that 
resembles the transnational park space of UNESCO 
world heritage guidelines. 
Managed Faith  
Wutai Shan is a world heritage site primarily visited by 
a particular type of tourist: residents of societies in 
which Buddhism has had a foundational role in identity 
formation for centuries. The vast majority of these 
visitors are Han Chinese, largely domestic but 
including members of the Chinese Diaspora. This 
illustrates the resurgent role of Mahayana and Tibetan 
Buddhism, both as faith and as cultural phenomenon, 
in China over the last two decades, especially in urban 
areas. As residents have grappled with a radical 
transformation of lived experiences, ranging from 
officially approved as well as unofficially tolerated 
personal values, to choices in jobs, education, housing, 
and even personal relationships, religious practices 
have gained in popularity (Kleinman, 2010). However, 
this renewed interest is easily overlooked if religious 
identity is conflated with religious practice. While Han 
Chinese increasingly identify with having (situational) 
faith (you xinyang) they are much less likely to 
foreground possessing religion (shi zongjiao) as a key 
part of their lives.  
If most of these Han Chinese visitors to Wutai Shan 
have worship intentions, are they therefore on a 
pilgrimage? Relative to the total number of visitors, 
few participate in formal pilgrimage circuits to the five 
peaks and designated sites along the way. Some 
tourists cover these routes by car or commercial tour 
bus, or spend a few days in a monastery guesthouse, 
either alone or with family or friends. A few, wealthy 
individuals fund private prayer services through 
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